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Over the last ten years, intemationai regimes emerged as a major focus of
empirical research and theoretical debate within international relations. The
interest in regimes sprang from a dissatisfaction with dominant conceptions
of intemationai order, authority, and organization. The sharp contrast be-
tween the competitive, zero-sum "anarchy" of interstate relations and the
"authority" of domestic politics seemed overdrawn in explaining coopera-
tive behavior among the advanced industrial states. The policy dilemmas
created by the growth of interdependence since World War II generated new
forms of coordination and organization that fit uneasily in a realist frame-
work.
Intellectual traditions emphasizing the "societal" dimension of intema-
tionai politics suffered, however, from a lingering taint of idealism. Realism
questioned the importance of intemationai law as a constraint on state be-
havior and by the 1970s, its positive study by political scientists was virtu-
ally moribund. The subfield of intemationai organization, and particularly
the study of regional integration, generated rich theoretical debates during
the 1960s.' Yet the field remained closely tied to the study of formal organi-
We are indebted to Don Babai, David Baldwin, Esther Barbe, Jack Donnelly, Jeff Frieden,
Barbara Geddes, Joe Grieco, Emst Haas, Peter Haas, Stanley Hoffmann, Peter Katzenstein,
Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Fritz Kratochwil, Charles Kupchan, David Lake, Doug
Nelson, Eric Nordlinger, Helen Milner, Andy Moravcsik, Craig Murphy, Joseph Nye, Robert
Putnam, John Ruggie, Raymond Vemon, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments.
1. For a review tracing the importance of the study of regional integration to later theoretical
developments, see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Intemationai Integration and Interde-
pendence," in Fred Grenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds.. Handbook of Political Science, vol. 8
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975). See also Emst Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1964), chaps. 1-5, 13-14; Joseph Nye, ed.. International Region-
alism (Boston: Little Brown, 196iS); Leon N. Lindberg and Sttiart A. Scheingold, sds.. Regional
Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Emst
Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute for Intemationai
Studies, 1975).
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zations, missing a range of state behavior that nonetheless appeared regu-
lated or organized in a broader sense. Few strong theories started from the
assumption that, as John Ruggie put it in a seminal article, "international
behavior is institutionalized.""
Regime analysis attempted to fill this lacuna by defining a focus that was
neither as broad as international structure, nor as narrow as the study of
formal organizations. Regime analysts assumed that patterns of state action
are influenced by norms, but that such norm-governed behavior was wholly
consistent with the pursuit of national interests. Hence, the regimes liter-
ature can be viewed as an experiment in reconciling the idealist and realist
traditions.
After a decade of development, it is time to submit this research program
to critical review. A plethora of contending theories have explained regime
creation, maintenance, and transformation, but the relationship among them
is unclear and empirical research has yet to determine which are the more
plausible. While earlier work on regimes focused on interdependence, the
widening variety of state goals, and the importance of non-state actors and
international organizations, recent work on regimes and intemationai coop-
eration unfortunately reverts to an approach which treats states as unified,
rational actors. In addition, little research has addressed whether, and in
what ways, regimes "matter."^ Do regimes have independent influence on
state behavior and, if so, how?
We begin by briefly surveying the contending definitions of international
regimes, which range from patterned behavior, to convergent norms and
expectations, to explicit injunctions. We then suggest a number of dimen-
sions along which regimes vary over time or across cases; these dimensions
have been or might be used to operationalize "regime change." They in-
clude strength, organizational form, scope, and allocational mode. The third
section examines four theoretical approaches to regimes—structural, game-
theoretic, functional, and cognitive—and attempts to clarify what each the-
ory can and cannot tell us about regimes.
In the conclusion, we ask how and whether regimes "matter." So far,
little research addresses this problem. Testing for the significance of re-
gimes—even to verify international systemic theories—demands careful
tracing of national level processes, structures, and values. We outline a re-
search program that focuses greater attention on issues raised by theorists
of complex interdependence; these issues have been neglected in the revival
of game theory, and include the erasure ofthe boundaries between domestic
and foreign policies, the importance of transnational coalitions, and, above
2. John Gerard Ruggie, "Intemationai Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends."
International Organization 29 (Summer 1975), p. 559.
3. Susan Strange, "Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regimes Analysis," in Stephen Kras-
ner, ed.. International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1983), pp. 337-54.Intemationai regimes 493
all, the way in which domestic political forces determine patterns of interna-
tional cooperation.
1. Regimes: Definitions
How do we know a regime when we see one? Three answers have been
offered to this question. The most comprehensive equates regimes with
pattemed behavior. Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins argue that "a
regime exists in every substantive issue-area in intemationai relations . . .
Wherever there is regularity in behavior, some kinds of principles, norms or
mles must exist to account for it.'"* But the existence of patterned behavior
alone should not lead one to suspect that a regime lurks below the surface. A
broad definition mns the risk of conflating regularized pattems of behavior
with mles, and almost certainly overestimates the level of normative con-
sensus in intemationai politics.^ Deducing regimes from pattemed behavior
makes it difficult to decide how they mediate, constrain, or influence behav-
ior. The term "regime" is sometimes used in a purely descriptive way to
group a range of state behaviors in a particular issue-area, but since the
potential for tautology is high, this approach has largely been abandoned.^
Stephen Krasner's influential definition seeks a middle ground between
"order" and explicit commitments; it stresses the normative dimension of
intemationai politics. Krasner defines a regime as "implicit or explicit prin-
ciples, norms, mles and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of international relations."^ Despite
the care with which this complex hierarchy of components is defined, "prin-
ciples" (which include not only beliefs of fact and causation, but also of
"rectitude") shade off into norms, "standards of behavior defined in terms
of rights and obhgations." Norms, in tum, are difficult to distinguish from
mles, "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action."*
4. Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins, "Intemationai Regimes: Lessons from Inductive
Analysis," in ibid., pp. 61-91.
5. Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty; vol. 1, Rules and Order (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 78-79. See also H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1961), chap. 1.
6. The concept of "system" suffered a similar fate during the 1960s. See Emst B. Haas, "On
Systems and Intemationai Regimes," World Politics 27 (January 1975), pp. 147-74; Jerome
Stephens, "An Appraisal of Some Systems Approaches in the Study of Intemationai Systems,"
International Studies Quarterly 16 (September 1972).
7. Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables," in Krasner, International Regimes, pp. 1-21. See also Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 19.
8. Friedrich Kratochwil makes a similar point in "The Force of Prescriptions," International
Organization 38 (Autumn 1984), p. 685; John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Intemationai
Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State," International Organization 40
(Autumn 1986), pp. 753-76; and Oran Young, "Intemationai Regimes: Toward A New Theory
of Institutions," World Politics 39 (October 1986), p. 106. Robert Keohane struggles with this494 International Organization
Not surprisingly, analysts have had serious disagreements about how the
"norms" and "principles" of a given regime should be defined; their differ-
ences have strong implications for interpretations of regime stability and
change. Susan Strange, John Zysman, and Stephen Cohen argue that
state practices such as selective safeguards and industrial targeting have
undermined the fundamental premises ofthe trade regime.^ John Ruggie, on
the other hand, contends that these derogations are consistent with a
broader ideological framework, which he calls "embedded liberalism,"
which will endure as long as there is some accommodation of economic
efficiency to social stability.'" It is exceedingly difficult to imagine any state
abandoning this ' 'norm''; the result is a bias in favor of seeing continuity and
a stable order.
The exphcitness of commitment required before a regime can be said to
exist creates a related problem. Focusing on "implicit regimes" captures the
convergence of actor expectations and may help us summarize a complex
pattem of behavior. But it begs the question of the extent to which state
behavior is, in fact, mle-governed. Robert Keohane's effort to trace postwar
cooperation in oil and Charles Lipson's study of changes in the treatment of
foreign investment exemplify unnecessary, if not misleading, uses of the
regime concept." In both cases, the rights and duties of different actors were
open to significant question and conflict. Violations ofthe norms governing
the treatment of foreign investment in the 19th century, for example, really
violated European (and primarily British) expectations. Do we gain ex-
planatory leverage in analyzing 20th-century investment disputes when we
point out that " 'national treatment' [became] an international norm"?'~
The core of Lipson's argument is not normative; national policies towards
problem in After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 58.
9. Susan Strange, "The Management of Surplus Capacity: or How Does Theory Stand Up to
Protectionism Seventies Style?" International Organization 33 (Summer 1979), pp. 303-34;
Stephen Cohen and John Zysman, "Double or Nothing: Open Trade and Competitive Indus-
try," Foreign Affairs 62 (Summer 1983), pp. 1113-39. For a careful application ofthe regime
concept to the trade system, see J. Finlayson and Mark Zacher, "The GATT and the Regulation
of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Effects," International Organization 35 (Autumn
1981), pp. 561-602.
10. John Ruggie, "Intemationai Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism
in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner, International Regimes, pp. 195-232.
11. Keohane, in After Hegemony, notes that a formal intemationai regime was never estab-
lished in oil (p. 140), but later refers to the postwar oil regime (p. 190). Charles Lipson, Standing
Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of Califomia Press, 1985), p. 32, includes in his object of analysis both pattems of
behavior and normative structures; the concept of regime is not central to his analysis, and is
used primarily as a summary of state behaviors. This is true also of Robert E. Wood, From
Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1986). For a defense of
this usage, see Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights Regimes," International Organi-
zation 40 (Summer 1986), pp. 599-642.
12. Lipson, Standing Guard, p. 262, emphasis in original.International regimes 495
foreign investment are neatly explained in terms of the investing countries'
relative power and the hosts' regulatory capabilities.
The "oil regime" between 1945 and 1970 consisted ofthe market activities
of oligopolistically interdependent firms, the national rules ofthe producers,
and ad hoc interventions by the United States. The Seven Sisters no doubt
followed certain "mles" conceming production, exploration, and market-
ing. But their behavior must be understood in terms of supply conditions, a
particular market stmcture, and national regulatory environments. The be-
havior of the major powers seems even less constrained by international
mles. How "convergent" were British, French, and American expectations
during the Suez crisis, in which the United States' diplomatic use of the oil
weapon played a key role? Clear American interests and the power to back
them adequately explain the outcome ofthe crisis. By endorsing the idea of
"tacit" or "implicit" regimes, Keohane overemphasizes the importance of
convergent expectations, particularly among govemments.
A third, more restricted definition treats regimes as multilateral agree-
ments among states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue-
area.'^ Regimes define the range of permissible state action by outlining
explicit injunctions. Regimes often contain mles which govem or specify
their own transformation, but to explain "regime change" per se is to ex-
plain why states would agree to modify the codified rights and mles that
regulate their behavior. This approach risks the charge of formalism—a
charge which has plagued the study of intemationai law. On the other hand,
it focuses attention on the evolution of the texts constituting intemationai
agreements; it also clearly separates normative consensus from the defini-
tion of regimes, treating it rather as a causal or constitutive variable that may
be useful in explaining cooperation.'"*
This definition also allows a sharper distinction between the concept of
regime and several cognates, such as cooperation.'^ Regimes are examples
of cooperative behavior, and facilitate cooperation, but cooperation can
take place in the absence of established regimes. A recent example was the
package of measures adopted by the advanced industrial states at the 1978
Bonn summit.'* Regimes must also be distinguished from the broader con-
cept of "institutions," the essential feature of which is "the conjunction of
13. This approach to regimes is closest to that of Oran Young, Resource Regimes: Natural
Resources and Social Institutions (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1982); p. 20; Com-
pliance and Public Authority (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1979); "Intema-
tionai Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," World Politics 32 (April 1980), pp. 331-35;
and "Anarchy and Social Choice: Reflections on the Intemationai Polity," World Politics 30
(January 1978), pp. 241-63; and Vinod Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International
Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1985), chap. 2.
14. See particularly Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism, p. 16.
15. On cooperation, see Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 51-52.
16. Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: The Seven Power Summits
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).496 International Organization
convergent expectations and patterns of behavior or practice.'*' Regimes
aid the "institutionaUzation" of portions of intemationai life by regularizing
expectations, but some international institutions such as the balance of
power are not bound to explicit rights and rules. "Convergent expectations"
may or may not be tied to explicit agreements—they might, in fact, arise in a
milieu characterized by substantial conflict. Finally, we should distinguish
between regimes and "order" or "stability." Regimes may facilitate order
and stability but are not coterminus with them.'** In some instances, regimes
may unintentionally contribute to instability, as when commitments to main-
tain parities under the Bretton Woods regime in the late 1960s produced
chaotic exchange markets.
2. Regimes: Dimensions of variance and change
Many studies fail to specify what they mean by regime transformation or
treat it in a unidimensional way. Regimes may change over time or vary
across cases in at least four ways: strength, organizational form, scope, and
allocational mode. As we shall argue, different theoretical approaches ad-
dress one or more of these variables, but are less useful in explaining others.
a. Strength
The majority of "regime change" studies try to explain why regimes
eventually weaken or decay." Stength is measured by the degree of com-
pliance with regime injunctions, particularly in instances where short-term
or "myopic" self-interests collide with regime mles.
b. Organizational form
In its quest to move beyond the study of concrete international organiza-
tions, recent regimes literature has largely ignored problems of organiza-
tional design and operation. Some issues are conducive to decentralized
regulation: regime injunctions may only call on states to share information,
or to refrain from certain actions, such as polluting, over-fishing, nuclear
testing, or raising tariffs. Other regimes, such as a fixed-exchange-rate re-
17. Oran Young, Compliance and Public Authority, p. 16: and his "Intemationai Regimes:
Toward a New Theory."
18. The dependent variable of structural analysis is often cast quite broadly. See. for ex-
ample, Duncan Snidal, "Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization 39
(Autumn 1985), pp. 579-614.
19. Explaining regime strength is central to the analysis of Lipson, Standing Guard; Aggar-
wal, Liberal Protectionism; Keohane, After Hegemony; and Stephen Krasner, Structural Con-
flict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of Califomia, 1985).Intemationai regimes 497
gimes, demand positive interventions by states, but remain largely decen-
tralized.
Most regimes, however, are likely to have at least some minimal adminis-
trative apparatus for the purpose of dispute settlement, the collection and
sheiring of information, or surveillance. Complex cooperative tasks require
more elaborate, and potentially autonomous, organizational structures. If
cooperation is already highly institutionalized, theories resting on assump-
tions of anarchy are highly misleading; blackboxing organizational stmc-
ture and processes will lead to simplistic predictions.^"
The principles governing representation are another dimension of organi-
zational variance. Most universalist regimes are structured either on the
"one nation, one vote" principle or, as in the Intemationai Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank, on weighted voting. Altemative principles of mem-
bership, however, are based on discrimination along functional or sectoral
lines (the Tokyo Round codes) or regional ones (the Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive). Principles of membership have important distributional consequences,
since they affect international agendas and organizational resource alloca-
tion.
c. Scope
Scope refers to the range of issues the regime covers. Though changes in
regime scope have attracted little theoretical attention, its neglect can cause
misleading characterizations. The failure to comply with certain GATT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) provisions signaled a weakening
of the trade regime in the 1970s. Yet at the same time, the regime's scope
expanded through the negotiation of the Tokyo Round codes.^' The most
contentious questions on the current trade agenda concem the regime's
scope—namely, how the GATT will address new issues such as trade in
services, industrial policy, and national mles governing foreign direct invest-
ment.
The jurisdictional scope of a regime is not incidental to its success. Overly
broad jurisdiction raises administrative costs and complexity, but overly
narrow agreements may allow little room for bargaining and issue-linkage.
One important cause of regime change is the "externalities" associated with
20. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 55. Neo-functionalists drew inspira-
tion from organization theorists, including James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). Robert Keohane, in After Hegemony, draws on neoclassical theo-
ries of organization, such as Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New
York: Norton, 1981), and Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975). See also W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Ra-
tional, Natural and Open Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), chap. 5.
21. Stephen Krasner, "The Tokyo Round: Pluralistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in
the Global Trading System," International Studies Quarterly 23 (December 1979), pp. 491-531.498 International Organization
inadequate scope. GATT negotiations in the 1950s and 1960s virtually elimi-
nated tariff barriers as an important impediment to trade. The result, how-
ever, was to expose, and even encourage, non-tariff barriers. These
externalities drove the reform efforts which culminated in the Tokyo Round.
d. Allocational mode
Regimes can endorse different social mechanisms for resource alloca-
tion.^^ A market-oriented regime supports the private allocation of re-
sources, discourages national controls, guarantees property rights, and
facilitates private contracting. As Oran Young states, "free enterprise sys-
tems . . . are not institutional arrangements operating outside or in the
absence of any regime. Such systems clearly require explicit structures of
property or use rights."^^ At the other extreme, authoritative allocation
involves the direct control of resources by regime authorities, and will de-
mand more extensive, and potentially autonomous, organizational struc-
tures. The IMF's role in the balance-of-payments financing regime provides
an example.
The nature of the issue-area and the extent of cooperation sought will
partly determine the preference for market-oriented versus authoritative
modes of allocation. Many issue-areas could be organized either way, how-
ever, with sharply different distributional consequences. The Group of 77's
proposal for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) provides the
clearest example. Virtually all of the NIEO debates centered on allocation
mechanisms, with the South generally favoring authoritative ^*
3. Theoretical approaches to regime change and variance
The literature on regime development and change can be grouped into four
families: structural, game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive. These catego-
ries are not mutually exclusive, and the most persuasive interpretations are
likely to draw from more than one theoretical tradition.^' Yet these ap-
22. Stephen Krasner makes this point in Structural Confiict.
23. Oran Young, Compliance and Public Authority, p. 55.
24. On the NIEO debate over modes of resource allocation, see Juergen Donges, "The Third
World Demand for a New Intemationai Economic Order," Kyklos 30 (no. 2, 1977) and Michael
Doyle, "Stalemate in the North-South Debate: Strategies and the New Intemationai Economic
Order," World Politics 35 (April 1983), pp. 426-64. For discussions of the NIEO in a regime
context, see Jeffrey Hart, The New International Economic Order: Confiict and Cooperation in
North-South Economic Relations, 1974-77 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Robert Roth-
stein, "Regime Creation by a Coalition ofthe Weak: Lessons from the NIEO and the Integrated
Program for Commodities," International Studies Quarterly 28 (Summer 1984) pp. 307-28:
Krasner, Structural Confiict.
25. Structural models have been given game-theoretic treatment by David Lake, "Beneath
the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of Intemationai Economic Structures," InternationalIntemationai regimes 499
proaches often speak past one another—in part because of fundamental
differences in their underlying assumptions, in part because they address
different dimensions of regime change and variance. We can gain a great
deal by being explicit about underlying assumptions and what each approach
can and cannot explain.
Most stmctural, game-theoretic, and functional theories of regimes are
state-centered, presuming unified rational actors, even if the assumption is
relaxed to gain explanatory leverage.^* Stmctural explanations, particularly
including the theory of hegemonic stability, attempt to show how intema-
tionai conditions define the possibilities for cooperation. Stmcturalists argue
that we cannot infer national policies from intentions because stmctures
tend to mold state behavior "toward a common quality of outcomes even
though the efforts and aims of agents and agencies vary."^' Game-theoretic
approaches incorporate exogenously determined preference orderings into
the analysis. While these preference rankings, in principle, include all do-
mestic factors that may impinge on a state's overall preferences, most re-
search emphasizes that actors are primarily constrained by the stmcture of
the interstate game. Functional theories, of which Robert Keohane's After
Hegemony is a leading example, also assume rational actors, but introduce
market imperfections, transactions, Emd information costs and uncertainty.
We argue that all three approaches downplay the central insight of interde-
pendence theorists: foreign policy is integrally related to domestic stmctures
and processes.
A group of theorists we have labeled (for want of a better term) "cognitiv-
ists" have suggested a radically different research program. Focusing on the
intersubjective meaning structures that bind actors together, they necessar-
ily see a looser fit between stmctural constraints, interests, and choices.
Where functional theories see regimes as more or less efficient responses to
fixed needs, cognitive theories see them as conditioned by ideology and con-
sensual knowledge and evolving as actors leam. Cognitivists argue that
"there is no fixed 'national interest' and no 'optimal regime.' "^* Presumably
determinative "stmctural" constraints must always be understood in terms
of historically conditioned, interpretive frameworks. This requirement
promises some corrective to the spare assumptions of other theoretical ap-
proaches, particularly by reminding us of historical context and the substan-
Studies Quarterly 28 (June 1984), pp. 143-70; Duncan Snidal, "Limits of Hegemonic Stability
Theory."
26. Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 7, explores the implications of introducing Simon's
notion of bounded rationality. Robert Axelrod argues that his own theory is not dependent on
rational utility maximization in The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984),
p. 18.
27. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1979), p. 74.
28. Emst Haas, "Words Can Hurt You: Or Who Said What to Whom About Regimes" in
Krasner, Intemationai Regimes, p. 57.500 International Organization
tive issues over which conflict and cooperation occur. Yet, to date, the
cognitivists have not adequately resolved their relationship with the struc-
turalist research program. The relationship between power, ideology, and
knowledge is one of the most exciting areas of theoretical debate, but one
strewn with basic methodological problems.^"^
a. Structuralism: The theory of hegemonic stability
The theory of hegemonic stability offers the most parsimonious and
widely employed explanation of regime dynamics; it links regime creation
and maintenance to a dominant power's existence and the weakening of
regimes to a waning hegemon. Ironically, the theory's early proponents
were interested primarily in the world economy's stability and openness and
did not mention the role of mles or regimes.^** In Power and Interdepen-
dence, Keohane and Nye first linked regime dynamics to waxing and waning
state power. They argued that, since power is not wholly fungible under
conditions of complex interdependence, linkage across issue-areas is not
likely to be effective. Keohane and Nye proposed a more disaggregated
"issue-structural" model, predicting that "stronger states in the issue sys-
tem will dominate the weaker ones and determine the rules ofthe game."^'
The theory of hegemonic stability has subsequently been challenged on
both empirical and theoretical grounds.^" First, the hazards of power analy-
29. The social theorist most interested in the relationship between knowledge and power is
Michel Foucault. See particularly Colin Gordon, ed.. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews
and Other Writings by Michel Foucault, 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon, 1980).
30. In his book. World In Depression (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1973),
Charles Kindleberger links the "stability" ofthe world economy to unilateral leadership by a
dominant power; no formal intemationai commitments or institutional machinery would be
required. Robert Gilpin's U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic
Books, 1975) and his War and Change in International Politics (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1981) make little reference to the role of intemationai mles. Stephen Krasner's
"State Power and the Structure of Intemationai Trade," World Politics 28 (April 1976), tests
the correlation between the distribution of economic power, the trade preferences of states, and
the openness of the intemationai trading system. David Lake, "Beneath the Commerce of
Nations," also makes no reference to the intervening role of intemationai regimes. Rather,
position within carefully specified intemationai economic structures directly conditions trade
policy preferences.
31. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 50-51.
32. A number of tests have been devised for the theory of hegemonic stability in recent years.
Reviewing the trade, money, and oil regimes between 1967 and 1977, Keohane concluded that
we lack compelling causal arguments linking hegemonic decline and regime change, particularly
for trade; Keohane, "Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in Intemationai Economic
Regimes, 1967-1977," in Ole Holsti, ed.. Change in the International System (Boulder: West-
view Press, 1980); Keohane, After Hegemony, chap. 9. Krasner's "Stmcture of Intemationai
Trade" found that hegemonic theory predicted trading patterns in some periods (1820-79.
1880-1900, 1945-60), but not in others (1900-13. 1919-39, 1960 to present). Timothy McKeown
argues that Britain did not actively encourage free trade in the 19th century, "Hegemonic
Stability Theory and 19th-century Tariff Levels in Europe," International Organization 31
(Winter 1983), pp. 73-91. Arthur Stein argues that hegemons cannot enforce free trade, but can
pay the price of asymmetric openness under certain domestic political conditions. "The Hege-International regimes 501
sis plague efforts to explain concisely the stmcture of regime dynamics.
Inferring interests from capabilities implies that there is some unambiguous
way to assess the distribution of capabilities. From this stmcture flows a
greatly restricted set of possible intemationai outcomes. The delineation of
the relevant structure, however, is bound to be arbitrary. David Lake offers
the most careful conceptualization of intemationai stmcture within the trade
area, including a measure of relative productivity as well as relative size.
These measures seek to explain both the capacity to underwrite or support
free trade and the willingness to do so. But as Jeff Frieden points out
(using Lake's data), the shift in the United States' share of world trade is
only minuscule between 1929, when the United States refused to lead, and
1960, the high point of American hegemony.^^ Can a move from 13.9 percent
of world trade in the earlier period to 15.3 percent in the latter account for
the sharp contrast in trade practices?
Second, since stmcture alone is a poor predictor of regime characteristics
and national policies, "structural" theories must continually revert in an
ad hoc way to domestic political variables. As Kindleberger recognized,
America's refusal to lead in the interwar period had a domestic foundation.^''
Similarly, Krasner found that stmcture predicted the openness ofthe trading
system in only half the cases he examined, with domestic institutionsil
"lags" introduced to explain the rest.^^ If such "slippage" is common, or if
similarly situated states tend to respond differently to intemationai con-
mon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the Intemationai Economic Order,"
International Organization 38 (Spring 1984), pp. 355-86. More positive assessments of the
theory's utility can be found in William P. Avery and David P. Rapkin, eds., America in a
Changing World Political Economy (New York: Longman, 1982), though most of the pieces
address the question of U.S. policy, as opposed to regime outcomes.
Several efforts have been made to confront hegemonic stability theory with altemative expla-
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"Hegemons, IOs and Markets: The Case ofthe Substitution Account," International Organiza-
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Change: Westem Collaboration on East-West Trade," World Politics 37 (April 1985), pp. 375-
402. In Standing Guard, Lipson couples a hegemonic decline argument with an analysis ofthe
changing capabilities of "weak" states. In one of the few efforts to test the theory against a
contending approach, Peter Cowhey and Edward Long find that theories of surplus capacity are
superior to the theory of hegemonic stability for predicting the timing of protection in auto-
mobile trade; see Cowhey and Long, "Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline
or Surplus Capacity?" International Organization 37 (Spring 1983), pp. 157-85.
Finally some have suggested that the theory is simply misspecified. Bmce Russett and Susan
Strange argue that American decline has been exaggerated; see Russett, "The Mysterious Case
of Vanishing Hegemony, or is Mark Twain Really Dead?" International Organization 39
(Spring 1985) pp. 202-31; and Strange, "Cave! Hie Dragones." Snidal (in "Hegemonic Stability
Theory") and Russett both argue that the theory has been misapplied to cases where provision
of a public good is not at stake.
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gency of Modem U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940" (UCLA, 1986).
34. Kindleberger, World in Depression, pp. 297-98.
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straints, than the primacy of structural theory is called into question. We
need theories of domestic processes or theories linking the international and
domestic levels.
Hegemonic interpretations of regimes are not always clear about what
hegemons actually do to promulgate and maintain a given set of rules; struc-
tural theories are, by their nature, less useful for understanding processes
than for establishing correlations. The two major schools of thought on the
mechanics of hegemonic leadership stress different solutions to the provi-
sion of public goods.^^ The "malign" view, associated with Gilpin's work,
sees the hegemon providing coercive leadership. The hegemon enforces
regime rules with positive and negative sanctions; it even extracts payment
from smaller states to maintain the regime. Thucydides describes, for ex-
ample, how Athens's "leadership" ofthe Delian League, based on consen-
sus, was gradually transformed into coercive empire.^^ This interpretation of
hegemony would cast doubt on the assumption that regimes are "coopera-
tive" institutions, even though benefits might accrue to the coerced actors.^**
Empirical studies suggest that we cannot assume the hegemon will enforce
regime compliance, however. Timothy McKeown's study of 19th-century
trade concludes that European liberalization had little to do with pressure
from England, but rather was the result of national policies towards industri-
Eilization.^^ Similarly, the United States tolerated derogations from "liberal"
norms in the first two postwar decades. Only when its relative power eroded
did the United States insist on "reciprocity."
The "benign" view of hegemony tums realism on its head.'**' Because they
benefit greatly from a well-ordered system, hegemons are willing to provide
36. Snidal, "Hegemonic Stability Theory."
37. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Random House, Modem Library edi-
tion), passim.
38. On the problem of "benign" coercion, see Michael Taylor, Community, Anarchy, Lib-
erty (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 10-25.
39. McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability Theory."
40. Kindleberger, World in Depression, initially made no reference to the theory of collective
action, but in a 1976 piece, he noted that "the provision ofthe world public good of economic
stability is best provided, if not by world govemment, by a system of mles." See his "Systems
of Intemationai Economic Organization," in David P. Calleo et al., eds.. Money and the
Coming World Order (New York: New York University Press, 1976). In "Hierarchy versus
Inertial Cooperation," International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), p. 841, he states that he
borrowed his concept of leadership from Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer, "I Get Along
with a Little Help from My Friends," World Politics 23 (October 1970), pp. 104, 120. See also
his "Intemationai Public Goods without Intemationai Leadership," American Economic Re-
view 76 (March 1986), pp. 1-13.
For approaches to regimes which depart from Olson's analysis of collective goods, see John
A. C. Conybeare, "Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the Intemationai Political Econ-
omy," International Studies Quarterly 28 (March 1984), pp. 5-22; Duncan Snidal, "Hegemonic
Stability Theory," and his excellent summary and organization of the literature. "Public
Goods, Property Rights and Political Organizations," International Studies Quarterly 23 (De-
cember 1979), pp. 532-66; Bruno Frey. International Political Economics (New York: Basil
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intemationai public goods. More precisely, the hegemon constitutes a
"privileged group," for which the cost of supplying the public good is less
than the benefit. But since the hegemon has an independent interest in
supplying public goods regardless of the contributions of others, beneficia-
ries of the system will have an incentive to free-ride. Rather than the strong
exploiting the weak, it is the weak who exploit the strong.
Two criticisms have been raised against the collective goods approach to
the hegemonic theory of regimes; both point to the inappropriate application
of otherwise sound theory. First, most regimes do not provide pure public
goods, which are characterized not only by jointness of supply but by non-
excludability. Most regimes have developed mechanisms that enhance com-
pliance through exclusion—for example, trade reciprocity, reciprocal rights
of innocent passage, and technological assistance in exchange for adherence
to non-proliferation agreements."*' Keohane and Snidal also point out that
nothing in the theory of collective action suggests that a single hegemon is
required to provide public goods.""^ If a privDeged subgroup exists such that
each member benefits from providing the good even without cooperation
from other members, the public good will be provided. Individual incentives
not to contribute will increase as the size of the privileged subgroup in-
creases, but certain characteristics of the regimes, such as those which
increase the transparency of state action, may mitigate this effect.
A broader criticism may be leveled against the theory of hegemonic stabil-
ity, however. The relevant "structure" is usually defined as the distribution
of power within the intemationai capitalist system rather than within the
world political system as a whole; regimes are seen primarily as responses to
the problems of collective action among the advanced capitalist countries
rather than as an integral part of high politics and alliance solidarity. Despite
aU the attention lavished on "intemationai stmcture" as an explanation of
regime creation and maintenance, bipolarity has been all but overlooked."*^
This hardly conforms with the views of the postwar planners who eon-
stmcted the Bretton Woods order."*"* The World Bank and IMF can be seen,
and indeed were seen by the Soviet Union, as an American effort to close
capitalist ranks at the Eastem bloc's expense; contrast America's insouciant
response to negotiations for the Bank for Intemationai Settlements in 1929
41. Trade reciprocity is not an example of an exclusionary device as long as there is a most-
favored nation provision. Most reductions in tariffs are negotiated by principle suppliers, how-
ever, and discriminatory treatment couched in the language of "reciprocity" has clearly grown.
For a discussion of impure public goods and so-called "club goods," which are excludable at a
cost, see Richard Cames and Todd Sandier, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and
Club Goods (New York: Cambridge University Press), chaps. 10-12.
42. Keohane, After Hegemony; Snidal, "Hegemonic Stability Theory."
43. Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 137, explicitly eschews consideration of the military-
economic linkage. Ethan Kapstein develops a perspective linking economic and security coop-
eration in "Alliance Energy Security," Fletcher Forum (1984), pp. 91-116.
44. See, for example, David Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, America and the World
Political Economy (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1973).504 International Organization
and its largely uncooperative attitude towards outstanding war debts
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The link between economic and security
relations is often ignored by American students of international political
economy; it is, however, a recurrent theme in the writing of Europeans. It
has been highlighted in new interpretations of the emergence of the postwar
Pacific order, and it is an underlying theme in the work of contemporary
diplomatic historians such as Paul Kennedy."*^ By ignoring grand strategy,
hegemonic interpretations may have missed this century's most important
"structural" cause of cooperation among the advanced industrial states.
b. Strategic and game-theoretic approaches
Game theory has recently been used to explain how cooperation can
evolve under anarchic conditions which lack supranational authority to en-
force compliance."*^ Again, we must distinguish regimes from cooperation,
which is clearly possible in the absence of regimes. Game theory can readily
explain the conditions under which regimes might arise as an instance of
cooperative behavior, and it can also suggest the conditions conducive to
stable compliance, but it has difficulty explaining organizational form,
scope, or change.
The attraction of game theory is its spare elucidation of a strategic interac-
tion's stmcture. The attendant risk is oversimplification, particularly given
the daunting problems which surround the application and testing of its
insights. Where multilateral interactions cannot be disaggregated into actor
dyads, the 2x2 game may mislead more than it clarifies. The alternative—
the n-person game—does not yield determinate outcomes.''^ The 2x2 game
also radically simplifies the choice set into unambiguous categories—coop-
erate and defect—though choices in most areas, such as macroeconomic
coordination, are continuous."** Games are also frequently depicted in their
45. See, for example, Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European American Relations
Since 1945 (New York: Continuum, 1980); Bmce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of
the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Con-
sequences," International Organization 38 (Winter 1984), pp. 1-40; Paul Kennedy, The
Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British Externai Policy, 1865-1980
(Glasgow: Fontana, 1981).
46. See the special issue of World Politics 38 (October 1985), edited by Kenneth Oye. See
also R. Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of Intemationai Coopera-
tion," American Political Science Review 70 (June 1983), pp. 330-46.
47. Duncan R. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley. 1957),
chap. 7.
48. For economists' efforts to model macroeconomic interdependence from a strategic per-
spective, see Koichi Hamada, "A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependence," Journal
of Political Economy 84 (August 1976), pp. 677-99; Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs, "Mac-
roeconomic Policy Coordination among the Industrial Economies," Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity (no. 1, 1984), pp. 1-64; Richard Cooper, "Economic Interdependence and
Coordination of Economic Policies," in R. Jones and Peter Kenen, eds., Handbook of Interna-
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normal rather than extensive form, though game theorists have shown
that this can lead one to overlook how the dynamics of bargaining and
sequencing of moves can determine outcomes.*^ The game may change
in the course of negotiations; indeed, bargaining is precisely an effort to re-
structure preference orderings.
The greatest difficulty is in specifying preferences at the outset, which
includes not only their ordering but their intensity.^** This effort must con-
sider all relevant factors ofthe game environment: economic and technologi-
CEil conditions, domestic politics, transnational relations, and the mles under
which the game is played. Deciding what the game is may be as difficult as
solving it. One is tempted to constmct the payoff in light of the outcomes,
which throws into question the predictive value ofthe exercise.
Game theory can cope in principle with a high degree of complexity.
Games may be "graduated" by introducing subgames, extended out into
meta- or super-games, "linked" to games in other issue-areas or modeled in
an evolutioneiry fashion. The result, however, is to detract from the selling
point, parsimony, and to question how the theory actually explains particu-
lar cases. Empirical studies too often lapse into descriptive history followed
by elaborate, and perhaps redundant, translation into game theoretical argot.^'
Most game theoretic studies of intemationai cooperation and regimes
have focused on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). PD is attractive since it can
produce cooperative behavior under "realist" conditions.^^ If play is re-
peated, the costs of defecting on any single move must be calculated not
only with reference to the immediate payoff, but with reference to the oppor-
tunity costs associated with future interactions. Yet under assumptions of
complex interdependence, the "dilemma" of PD diminishes. The very exis-
tence of a network of regimes and transnational relations among the ad-
49. For example, Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Confiict among Nations: Bargaining,
Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Wnceton University
Press, 1977), p. 40; Steven J. Brams and M. P. Hessel, "Threat Power in Sequential Games,"
International Studies Quarterly 28 (March 1984), pp. 33-34.
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applications of game theory than their ordering. As Robert Jervis notes, however, "cooperation
is more probable when mutual cooperation is only slightly less attractive than exploiting the
other, when being exploited is only slightly worse than mutual competition and when the latter
outcome is much worse than mutual cooperation." "From Balance to Concert: A Study of
Intemationai Security Cooperation," in World Politics 38 (October 1985), p. 64.
51. For a review of this problem, see Duncan Snidal, "The Game Theory of Intemationai
Politics," ibid., pp. 25-57.
52. Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982);
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984) and "The
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306-18; Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1976) and Community,
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vanced industrial states facilitates communication, enhances the importance
of reputation, and lengthens the "shadow of the future.""^^ In its heuristic
use, PD indicates why these institutions deter suboptimal outcomes: more
compelling theories of how these institutions actually evolve are still in their
infancy.
Most applications of game theory to the study of international cooperation
have assumed unified state actors and the dominance of the international
game. These presumptions are strongly challenged by earlier literature on
transnational relations and bureaucratic politics. As with structural ap-
proaches, the domestic processes affecting payoff structures are frequently
blackboxed as "exogenous." As we shall argue in the conclusion, one must
analyze the tradeoffs a state, or more accurately, a particular political lead-
ership, is willing and able to make between domestic and foreign games.
This certainly doesn't mle out the application of game theory, but it de-
mands that we reorient our effort towards the analysis of domestic/
intemationai linkages.
Game-theoretic approaches are strongest when they reveal the conditions
which enable cooperation and stability; they say far less about whether
regimes will actually arise, how they will be institutionalized, and, above all,
the rules and norms which will comprise them.'"* Functionalist logic provides
a useful supplement.
c. Functional theories
Functioned theory explains behaviors or institutions in terms of their ef-
fects.^^ If regimes serve to reduce information and transaction costs among
their adherents, for example, the rewards of compliance will reinforce the
regime. Thus, anticipated consequences explain the persistence of the re-
gime and compliance with its injunctions. Similarly, the modification of
regimes or their weakening is likely to occur when they become "dysfunc-
tional." Functional theories explain regime strength, particularly the puzzle
of why compliance with regimes tends to persist even when the structural
conditions that initially gave rise to them changes.
Functional theories have important limitations. They are not causal in a
strong sense. They are better at specifying when regimes will be demanded
rather than suggesting how or when they will be supplied. Regimes and
53. Joanne Gowa, "Cooperation and Intemationai Relations," International Organization 40
(Winter 1986), 167-86; Snyder and Diesing, Confiict among Nations.
54. Duncan Snidal, "Coordination versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for Intemationai
Cooperation and Regimes," American Political Science Review 79 (December 1985), pp. 923-
42.
55. "Functional" here refers to a particular form of explanation, and should be distinguished
from earlier functional and neofunctional theories of intemationai organization. For a discus-
sion of earlier work, see Emst Haas, Beyond the Nation State, chaps. 1-5, 13-14. For a general
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cooperation in one issue-area may arise as an unintended consequence of
cooperation in some other area. For example, three countries may respond
to a security threat from a fourth with a cooperative venture, yet the regime
may persist because of the positive extemalities generated by military coop-
eration. Unless functional theories suggest how a selection mechanism oper-
ates, they can easily become teleological, a problem suffered by earlier
functionalist writing, which viewed intemationai cooperation as a response
to imputed "system-maintenance" or "equilibrating" functions.^* Collec-
tive action may not occur because ofthe free-rider problem or if the "need"
goes unperceived." This criticism need not deter one from formulating a
functionalism that operates through individual motivations, peirticularly
where existing institutions mitigate the collective action dilemma. The re-
gime's benefits are simply that it provides incentives to certain forms of
cooperative action, for example, by offering fomms in which reputation
comes into play or where games can be iterated and linked. Regimes may be
"supplied" when there is sufficient "demand" for the functions they per-
form, but the market analogy has obvious limitations. In any case, this
approach seems little different from an intentional theory that begins from
old-fashioned interests.
The specific functions that regimes perform naturally vary from issue-area
to issue-area. Most functionalist theorizing suggests that some generalized
functions are underprovided, given conditions of anarchy or market failure.
Regime analysts working in this vein have drawn heavily from the economic
literature on transaction costs. In this literature, organizations, or "hierar-
chies," evolve as solutions to the opportunism, uncertainty, information
costs, measurement problems, and difficulties of contract enforcement
which plague arms-length market transactions.^* Drawing an analogy be-
tween the market and the uncoordinated actions of states, Keohane, Oye,
and Aggarwal have shown that regimes reduce transactions costs and facili-
tate decentralized rule-making.'' Aggarwal notes that "constmction of a
multilateral mechanism is organizationally less expensive than is the devel-
opment of many bilateral contracts."^ Keohane notes that the marginal cost
56. Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 81.
57. Jan Elster, "Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory," Theory and Society 11 (July-
August 1982), p. 462.
58. See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications
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of dealing with an additional issue will be lower with a regime, an insight that
casts light on the important question of why regimes often expand in scope.'''
Once these functions are enumerated, the remaining positive research
program which follows is unclear. Crude functionalism has been criticized
for simply noting that some behavior or institution—in this case, a regime—
does, in fact, perform an anticipated function. Even if we knew that every
regime performed some specified set of functions, this knowledge would not
explain why regimes emerge in some issue-areas and not in others.
Nor would it explain why some regimes develop impressive formal organi-
zations, while others do not. Unlike the transactions cost literature, the
institutional solution resulting from failed interstate coordination is not a
"hierarchy" in Williamson's sense. Numerous institutional solutions to a
given problem of cooperation are possible, and little work has been done to
show how particular contracting problems may yield particular governance
solutions. In general, the "new functionalism" does not distinguish clearly
between institutions and organizations, nor indicate the conditions that lead
to the international development of the latter.*"^
In addition, we are interested not only in the fact that regimes perform
certain tasks, but the importance or weight regimes have in motivating and
explaining state behavior. The proper test of a functional theory is not the
mere existence of a regime, but the demonstration that actors' behavior was
motivated by benefits provided uniquely, or at least more efficiently,
through the regime, or by reputational concerns connected to the existence
of rules.
Finally, a strong liberal bias operates in the "new functionalism" just as it
did in the old. Though Keohane admits that cooperation is not, in itself, a
good, he tends to emphasize the functions which enhance global welfare, or
at least the collective welfare of the regime's adherents. The bias is sug-
gested by Keohane's premise ofthe "suboptimality" of market failure. But
the institutions "provided" may or may not be Pareto superior, let alone
optimal, and can certainly result in different distributional outcomes. The
institutions that emerge in world politics are certainly more likely to reflect
the interests of the powerful than the interests of the weak, a complaint
repeatedly raised by commodity producers against the operation of the
GATT. Aggarwal argues that regimes control large states' behavior toward
the small by reducing the need to exercise power directly. He demonstrates
that regimes have occasionally kept domestic protectionist interests from
61. Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 103-6.
62. Oran Young makes this point in "Intemationai Regimes: Toward a New Theory of
Institutions" and Snidal grapples with it in "Coordination versus Prisoner's Dilemma." The
most lucid statement of variations in organizational form remains Ruggie, "Intemationai Re-
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achieving their preferred solutions. Yet his analysis ofthe textile regime also
demonstrates that most of the functions which regimes perform can be used
to control states when the initial discrepancies of power are large, and that
stronger players frequently ignore the "restraints" placed on them. The
regime changed when it could not adequately serve the interests of the
developed country importers.^^ How do we decide between Cheryl Payer's
Marxist functionalism, which asserts that the World Bank operates as an
instmment of Northem control, and a benign, liberal functionalism, which
sees it as a more-or-less optimal institutional response to "failures" in inter-
national capital markets?^ Douglass North has outhned the problem in a
trenchant review of the transaction costs literature:
One cannot have the productivity of an industrial society with political
anarchy. But while ... a state is a necessary condition for realizing the
gains from trade, it obviously is not sufficient. A state becomes the in-
evitable source of stmggle to take control of it in the interests of one of
the parties. The state then becomes the vehicle by which the costs of
transacting are raised to capture the gains that will accrue to any inter-
ested party that can control the specification and enforcement of prop-
erty rights.*^
Substituting "regime" for "state" in the foregoing passage raises a prob-
lem for functioneilist analysis. Functional theories emphasize how the
facilitating role of regimes helps them realize common interests. But regimes
are also arenas for conflict and the exercise of power. Because functional
theories assume highly convergent interests and downplay divergent ones,
they do not explore how regimes may institutionalize inequalities.
d. Cognitive theories: Knowledge, ideology, and regimes
"Cognitive" theories explore what stmctural, game-theoretic, and func-
tional approaches bracket.** The core cognitive insight is that cooperation
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65. North, "Govemment and the Cost of Exchange," p. 260.
66. "Cognitive" would best be left in quotation marks throughout, since we use the term to
refer to a quite disparate group of approaches. We focus on the commonalities among those
writers emphasizing ideology, belief systems, and knowledge as explanations of regime change.
For other cuts at "cognitive" approaches that focus more squarely on the individual decision-
maker see Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Approach
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
The critique of stmcturalist and game-theoretic approaches from a hermeneutic, historicist,
or "dialectical" viewpoint includes Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," Interna-
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cannot be completely explained without reference to ideology, the values of
actors, the beliefs they hold about the interdependence of issues, and the
knowledge available to them about how they can realize specific goals.
Cooperation is affected by perception and misperception, the capacity to
process information, and leaming. While structural, game-theoretic, and
functional theories assume that cooperation operates within an issue-area
which is relatively unambiguous, cognitivists point out that issue-areas are
never simply given. Cognitive approaches are therefore particularly impor-
tant in explaining the substantive content of regime rules and why they
evolve. By elevating the importance of actor learning, cognitive theories
have a dynamic other theoretical approaches lack.
Cognitive approaches cannot predict at what point consensual values or
knowledge will produce cooperation. Consensus still may not overcome
problems of collective action. More importantly, "ends, or purposes, of
action are not self-evidently derivable from the scientific understanding of
relationships among variables.'"'^ The generation of new knowledge just as
easily might render a game less cooperative by exposing new incentives to
defect.*^ Nor can cognitive approaches argue that a particular regime is
uniquely suited to realize some common values. Criticizing the hegemonic
stability theory, Ruggie argues that regimes reflect not only a configuration
of power, but also a configuration of dominant social purpose.^"^ Ruggie's
concept of "embedded liberalism" tries to describe the common social pur-
pose that arose after the Great Depression across the advanced capitalist
states—the need to reconcile the advantages of liberalism and the costs of an
unfettered market system. Yet this "purpose" is elastic enough to subsume
a fairly wide range of "norm-governed changes," including the move from
fixed to flexible exchange rates and the rise ofthe new protectionism during
the 1970s. For this very reason, it cannot fully explain these changes.
Cognitivists argue that learning and, in a somewhat different fashion,
ideology, affect international rules and cooperation by showing the merit (or
futility) of certain lines of action. Knowledge and ideology, including the
knowledge provided by regimes, can alter actor interests. But the cognitive
1983), pp. 261-85; Ruggie and Kratochwil, "IO as an Art ofthe State," particularly pp. 764-66
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critique reaches deeper. Even this causal language—knowledge "affects"
interests—is inappropriate, since the dichotomy between ideology and
knowledge on the one hand, and interests on the other, is wholly artificial
and misleading. "Interests" only emerge within particular normative and
epistemic contexts and cannot be understood outside them. Cognitivists
argue that the assumption of rational utility maximization, for example, is
too spare to be of explanatory value, since it ignores the way that historically
situated actors interpret their constraints. Nor is the problem solved simply
by showing that rationality is "bounded" in various ways. Such a modifica-
tion predicts deviations from "rational" decision-making in environments
characterized by incomplete information, uncertainty, complexity, but still
divorces the concept of interest from shared meanings. The recurrent struc-
turalist fallacy is to expect different states or individuals to respond similarly
to the same structural constraints and opportunities; much depends on past
history, knowledge, and purpose.
It is very difficult to generalize from the central cognitive insight. The
predictive value of cognitive theories is problematic, particularly when they
emphasize the importance of consensual knowledge. Historical episodes
of cooperation may be inexplicable without reference to shared knowledge
and meanings, but since future knowledge is, by definition, impossible to
foresee, prediction about the substantive content of cooperation is ruled out.
Nonetheless, the degree of ideological consensus and agreement over causal
relationships, regardless of the nature of the issue, is an important variable
in explaining cooperation.
Studies taking a cognitive perspective frequently have an evolutionary,
historicist, or, less kindly, post hoc flavor that highlights contingency and
path-dependence. Emst Haas summarizes the methodological biases of one
cognitivist:
The type of systems theory I find useful features the inductive method
in the construction of reality and uses the perceptions and actions of
concrete human beings in grappling with reality as its main data. Such
systems are assumed "open" in the sense that they do not tend, by
definition, toward a given state, such as equilibrium. They are "con-
structed" in the sense that the theorist considers them as heuristic
approximations rather than networks of determinative "laws"
constraining choice.™
Ideology and knowledge can be construed and combined in a number of
ways, creating a wide range of possible research strategies. Writers em-
phasizing the role of consensual knowledge have naturally focused on areas
of technical cooperation. Richard Cooper has shown how a slow and painful
evolution of consensus on the causes of disease transmission was critical for
70. Emst Haas, "Is There a Hole in the Whole?" p. 839.512 International Organization
intemationai cooperation on public health in the 19th century.^' Don Babai
argues that structuralist models are ill-equipped to explain the types of
changes which took place at the World Bank under Robert McNamara. The
evolution of knowledge, as well as intellectual fashion concerning develop-
ment, shaped the Bank's lending strategy.^" Cognitive theories which explain
intemationai cooperation primarily with ideological variables are more rare.
Judith Goldstein's work on U.S. trade policy, however, argues that a liberal
ideology has become institutionalized in a way that systemmatically condi-
tions the propensity to cooperate, even where defection might be more
rational.''
Sorting out the autonomous influence of knowledge and ideology can
prove extremely difficult in practice, particularly where there is a congru-
ence between ideology and structural position. If structural theories are
weak on cognitive variables, most cognitive theories cannot describe clearly
how power and ideas interact. The same set of objections may even extend
to knowledge-oriented "cognitivism." While few would claim that scientific
knowledge is reducible to social interests, scientific evidence can be re-
sisted. The range of scientific investigation, if not its content, is also shaped
by social and political purposes. Cognitive theory needs to specify more
clearly the types of issues and conditions under which consensual knowl-
edge is likely to drive cooperation.'"* Are they many or few? No one would
disagree that purposes, values, and knowledge matter, but when? What is
the relationship between the cognitivist research program and that outlined
by various forms of structuralism?
Cognitivists pose a simple, yet profound, question: can interests in an
issue area be unambiguously deduced from power and situational con-
71. Richard Cooper, "International Cooperation in Public Health as a Prologue to Mac-
roeconomic Cooperation" (Harvard University, 1986); and "Intemationai Economic Coopera-
tion: Is It Desirable? Is It Likely?" Bulletin ofthe American Academy of Arts and Sciences 39
(1985).
72. Don Babai, "Between Hegemony and Poverty: The World Bank in the Intemationai
System" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Califomia, Berkeley, 1984). For other work in this
vein, see Beverly Crawford and Stefanie Lenway, "Decison Modes"; Ernst Haas, Mary Pat
Williams, and Don Babai, Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Information in
International Organizations (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1977); Emmanuel Adler,
"Ideological 'Guerillas' and the Quest for Technological Autonomy: Brazil's Domestic Com-
puter Industry," International Organization 40 (Summer 1986), pp. 673-706.
73. Judith Goldstein, "The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection," Ameri-
can Political Science Review 80 (March 1986), pp. 161-84. Other analyses emphasizing the role
of ideology in regime maintenance and change are Robert Cox, "Ideologies and the New
Intemationai Economic Order: Refiections on Some Recent Literature," International Organi-
zation 33 (Spring 1979), pp. 257-302; Jason L. Finkle and Barbara Crane, "Ideology and
Politics at Mexico City: The United States at the 1984 Intemationai Conference on Population,"
Population and Development Review 11 (March 1985), pp. 1-28; Charles Kindleberger, "The
Rise of Free Trade in Europe, 1820-1875," Journal of Economic History 4 (March 1975). pp.
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straints? Frequently they cannot. Without shifts in power position, interests
change as a result of leaming, persuasion, and divine revelation. Knowledge
and ideology may then become an important explanation of regime change,
but when posed in this fashion, the question is an empirical as much as a
theoretical one. The resolution of the debate between structuralists and
cognitivists will depend on tests that allow a confrontation between the two
approaches without violating the epistemological tenets of either.
4. Conclusion: Recapturing politics
Current theories of intemationai regimes have ignored domestic political
processes, in part because ofthe lure of parsimonious systemic theory. This
neglect has extended to the issue of how regimes actually influence national
policy choices, a question closely related to the issue of compliance and
regime strength. More broadly, there have been few studies ofthe domestic
politica] determinants of intemational cooperation. There are both method-
ological and theoretical reasons to open the black-box of domestic politics.
Even if one adopts a stmctural explanation of compliance and defection,
validating such claims demands careful reconstmction of decision-making at
the national level. But the neglect of the domestic political and economic
realm has had deeper costs, including a neglect of the substantive issues
over which states are likely to seek cooperation and the basic forces leading
to regime change. To address these difficulties, we suggest a research pro-
gram that views intemationai cooperation not only as the outcome of rela-
tions among states, but of the interaction between domestic and
intemationai games and coalitions that span national boundaries.
Do regimes "matter"?
Regimes are said to affect state behavior in two ways. One, emphasized in
functionalist and game-theoretic approaches, is that regimes have altered the
situation or setting in which states interact so that cooperation is more
likely. The literature on iterated Prisoner's Dilemma claims that altering the
institutional environment—by lengthening the shadow ofthe future, limiting
the number of players, increasing the transparency of state action, and alter-
ing the payoff stmcture—can increase the incentives to cooperate. Func-
tionalist theories emphasize that regimes reduce the transactions costs
associated with bilateral contracting.
How do we know if these claims are correct? More importantly, how do
we know that these explanations of cooperative behavior are superior to
altemative explanations? Two methods could substantiate these claims.
Large-n studies could determine whether or not regimes are, in fact, associ-
ated with the institutional factors specified ex ante by the theory. Far more514 International Organization
convincing, however, would be evidence that domestic policymakers were
actually concemed with reputation, reducing transactions costs, the need for
transparency, and so forth, when facing decisions about regime creation and
compliance. Even if one advances a structural explanation, the most con-
vincing evidence must be found in the calculations of national decision-
makers. Drawing on the work of Alexander George, Vinod Aggarwal
employs such a method of "process tracing" in analyzing the influence of
intemationai structure on national textile policies.''' Surprisingly little work
of this kind has been done.
An even stronger claim for regimes is that they can alter actors' interests
or preferences, which are generally held constant in functional and game-
theoretic formulations. Cognitivists claim that regimes may change basic
definitions of reality. Over the 1970s, for example, the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provided the institutional
locus for a new Third World critique of the existing international economic
order. UNCTAD virtually served as a secretariat for the Group of 77 devel-
oping countries; it provided studies and documentation that were crucial in
defining individual LDC's positions in international forums.^*'
Where regimes are actually suspected of altering state preferences, the
proposed research program should focus on domestic decision-making for
verification, since other forces may also be at work simultaneously. This can
be seen by examining the problems of compliance and defection.
A fit between regime rules and national behavior may not occur for three
reasons. The first is that the norms characterizing the regime may not be
formulated to be authoritatively binding. Some regimes, such as those gov-
eming human rights, allow self-selected national exemptions or represent
only broad collective aspirations; they are, in effect, born weak.^^ Opportun-
ism presents a second reason for disjuncture between regime norms and
state behavior. States may negotiate regimes with the intention of breaking
them or knowingly exploit others' compliance in order to extract higher
payoffs.
A final possibility, and a more common and politically interesting one, is
what Robert Putnam has called "involuntary defection."^^ This defection
happens when a party reaching or supporting an international agreement is
unable to sustain commitments because of domestic political constraints.
Three examples suggest the pervasiveness of this phenomenon. The first is
75. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism, pp. 16, 19.
76. Rothstein, Global Bargaining.
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the rise ofthe "new protectionism" in the advanced industrial states. Taking
the form of quantitative restrictions in particular products aimed at particu-
lar exporting countries, these "orderly marketing agreements" and "vol-
untary export restraints" clearly violate GATT norms, especisilly the
non-discrimination norm. Yet they are driven by efforts to diffuse political
pressures, while simultaneously limiting the extent of protection, both by
product and by trading partner. This practice has, in tum, affected the
nature of the regime. Not surprisingly, there is little agreement on a code
goveming the use of selective safeguards, but the consensus seems to be
moving towards a tolerance of their use.'' Recent research on the implemen-
tation of IMF stabilization programs suggests a similar phenomenon.^" Some
programs are no doubt negotiated in bad faith, with little intention of fulfill-
ment. More commonly, those at the negotiating table are simply unable to
control those in the palace or in the streets. A final example may be drawn
from the interwar period. Great Britain's strong commitment to maintaining
the gold standard during the 1920s stimulated strong industrial opposition to
the Bank of England's policies, contributing to the final decision to go off
gold in 1931.*'
"Defection" in such instances is not the result of calculating unified ac-
tors, but the outcome of domestic political conflicts which no single actor
can control. How intemationai agreements play into these domestic political
fights is still poorly understood. Reputation has appeared in arguments
against "rash" protectionist moves. Occasionally, the IMF has been used to
implement programs that would have been impossible without outside pres-
sure. The Bank of England argued that defending parity was key to British
leadership in intemationai financing affairs. On the other hand, opposition
forces have used the government's compliance with regime injunctions to
their own political benefit, arguing that they could have extracted a superior
bargain by defecting, or that bowing to outside pressure is intolerable.
Joanne Gowa shows how those defending the closing of the gold window
portrayed regime mles as overly restrictive of national autonomy .^^
Towards a new theory of international cooperation
Building a theory of cooperation and regime change demands that we
retum to the central insight of the interdependence literature: growing inter-
dependence means the erasure of the boundaries separating intemationai
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and domestic politics. "Domestic" political issues spill over into interna-
tional politics and "foreign policy" has domestic roots and consequences.
Governments, when making choices about regime creation and compliance,
try to preserve the benefits of cooperation while minimizing the costs that
may fall on politically important groups. This insight appears to have been
lost in much recent writing about regimes. One approach would be to start
with the domestic-level game, and consider the conditions favorable to
cooperation. This approach assumes that a state's decision to enter into and
abide by international rules can be treated in the same way as any other
public policy choice.**^ An institutionalist approach, for example, would sug-
gest that the arena in which decisions are made conditions the ability of state
elites to sustain commitments. Decisions made in insulated arenas may not
be pulled as much by "uncooperative" forces. On the other hand, the decen-
tralization of certain policies, such as banking regulation and tax policy in
the United States, may inhibit the formation of international regimes. A
coalitional approach would emphasize the constellation of domestic actors
standing to benefit from cooperation. The Reagan administration's 1985
decision to seek international cooperation on the dollar and exchange rates
was prodded in part by export interests and firms facing import competition.
Starting with the "unit" level is risky, since the interactive effects of
international structures, bargaining, and rules on domestic politics can get
lost. Peter Katzenstein's work on small European democracies attempts to
capture such feedback, at least over a long historical period.**"* The position
of small states in the intemationai system influences the development of
domestic institutions in predictable ways; these institutions, in turn, affect
these states' ability to adjust to the dictates of a liberal international and
regional order.
The next step is to develop interactive models that link domestic and
international politics more closely. Robert Putnam has suggested that epi-
sodes of international cooperation must be viewed as "two-level games. "'^''
At one level, representatives of different countries seek to reach or sustain
international agreements; at a second level, those same representatives must
build the political support required to sustain commitments and establish
credibility. These processes often occur simultaneously and expectations
about the likelihood of gaining acceptance in one arena influence the bar-
gaining process in the other.
Another approach focuses on the transnational coalitions that span coun-
tries. This method is adopted by Ernst Haas in his classic study The Uniting
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of Europe, but this line of research has not been adequately pursued. For
example, does some synchronization of coalitional pattems or electoral cy-
cles across states make cooperation more likely? Where a nation may lack a
winning coalition domestically, can pressure or support from extemal actors
tip policy in the direction favored by the cooperative minority? Robert Put-
nam and Nicholas Bayne suggest this may have occurred in the German de-
cision to reflate in 1978.^
The central point is that growing interdependence means that groups at
the domestic level increasingly have "regime interests." Welfare is tied not
only to particular policy decisions, but to other states' compliance with
regime norms, the way in which intemationai cooperation is institutional-
ized, and the access regimes provide for private actors. Structural theory
alerted us to the myopia of the second image. It would be a misfortune if the
quest for parsimonious systemic theory displaced other research and theo-
retical traditions that study domestic histories and, above all, politics.
86. Robert D. Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
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